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New York State and New York City face an enormous fiscal crisis that currently 
threatens delivery of education, health care, and basic services. Furthermore, the proposed cuts to 
balance the budget will undermine job creation and economic growth. However, New York 
could reduce the severity of this crisis by reintroducing a low-level Stock Transfer Tax on all 
shares exchanged on Wall Street. This Research Brief evaluates just such a proposal.
2  The New 
York State Assembly and the New York City Council are debating a reintroduction of the tax at 
half the rate that prevailed at the time of its repeal.  The revenues from the tax, at around $3.4 
billion under current stock market conditions, would be shared equally by the New York City 
and State governments. 
 
The principal benefit of the proposal is clear. The public revenue it would generate would 
allow both the State and City to avoid sharp cuts in their ability to provide health, education, 
public safety, and other vital services.  The increased revenues would also help counter the 
damage such fiscal austerity would inflict in terms of worsening the State’s recession. In terms of 
New York City alone, the $1.7 billion in direct revenue for the City amounts to 5 percent of 
current city-funded expenditures totaling approximately $32 billion.  The Independent Budget 
Office (2003b) forecasts shortfalls of $2.2 billion in 2004, $3.9 billion in 2005, $4.0 billion in 
2006, and $3.7 billion in 2007. This additional revenue would cover roughly half of the average 
of these annual shortfalls, saving jobs and public services and generating positive ripple effects 
throughout the New York economy. 
 
Despite these sizeable benefits, opponents of the proposal argue that reinstating the STT 
could produce negative unintended consequences that could then contribute to a worsening of 
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overall economic conditions in the City and State. In this Research Brief, we evaluate two 
potential negative consequences: 
 
1.  A reduction in employment in the securities industry that could then lead to broader 
cuts in private sector employment in the region. 
2.  The relocation of the New York Stock Exchange to alternative trading platforms or 
northern New Jersey as a means of enabling traders on the exchange to circumvent 
the tax. 
 
Overall, we conclude that reinstating the STT at half the rate that prevailed in the early 
1980s can play a substantial positive role in as a means of addressing the current fiscal crisis in 
both the City and State of New York.   We also recognize that negative consequences might 
emerge from reintroducing the STT.  But in our assessment, the increase in overall trading costs 
that the STT would impose will be relatively modest, raising average transaction costs to a level 
that would still be below those which prevailed as recently as the late 1990s.  As such, we 
conclude from the evidence that these negative effects associated with the STT are likely to be 
correspondingly modest—in particular, that there will likely be no large-scale job losses 
resulting from the STT and that firms now trading on the NYSE are not likely to switch to 
alternative platforms. 
 
How it would work 
 
The State of New York initially instituted a Stock Transfer Tax (STT) in 1905 and all the 
tax revenues were shifted to New York City in 1966. It was phased out between 1979 and 1981.  
However, it is still nominally “paid” to the state on paper and immediately rebated back to the 
payer.  In other words, although traders in New York’s stock markets have not faced any tax 
obligation since 1981, the apparatus to operate the tax remains in place.  Therefore, in terms of 
start-up costs, the City and State would not face serious difficulties in reinstating the tax. 
 
  At the time of its repeal in 1981, the tax operated on a sliding scale basis relative to the 
selling price of a traded share.  For shares whose sale price was under $5.00, the tax rate was 
1.25 cents per share sold.  The rate then rose gradually to five cents per share for stocks selling at 
$20 or above.  The STT also included a maximum tax obligation for a given trade of $350. 
 
  The current proposal for reinstating the tax suggests that the new rates should be one-half 
those at the time of repeal.  In other words, the tax would begin at 0.63 cents per share sold.  The 
rate would then rise to a maximum of 25 cents per share sold for stocks selling at $20 or above.  
The maximum tax obligation would then be $175 per trade. In this Research Brief, we have 
focused our analysis on the effects of a tax set at this rate, i.e one-half the rate as of 1981. 
 
It is important to make clear that the total tax obligation applies to both parties to the 
stock trade.  The tax rates we have cited are therefore what are known as the “two-sided” rate, 
since it applies to both parties.  But this also means that for each party to the transaction, they 
would tend to assume only one-half of the total obligation.  In other words, what is called the 
“one-sided” tax rates are one-half of the “two-sided” rates.  Thus, with the current STT proposal, 
the lowest one-sided rate is 0.32 cents per share traded, and the highest one-sided rate is 1.25   3
cents per share.  The maximum tax obligation calculated on a “one-sided” basis would therefore 
be $87.50. 
 
  To illustrate how the STT would operate in practice, let us consider a transaction for a 
single share of stock valued at $25, which happens to be the average price of equity shares in the 
New York Stock Exchange in January 2003.  In this case, the one-sided tax rate would be at the 
maximum level of 1.25 cents.  The tax rate on this average transaction would be 0.05 percent 
(i.e. 1.25 cents is 0.05 percent of $25).  Now consider a case in which 100,000 shares of this 
same stock were traded.  This $2.5 million transaction would be taxed at the maximum rate of 
$175, or $87.50 on a “one-sided” basis.  This amounts to a one-sided tax rate of 0.004 percent 
($87.50 is 0.004 percent of $2.5 million).  As we see, the tax rate continues to fall as the size of 
transactions increase, given that the maximum tax paid is $175. 
 
The Costs of the Tax: The Risk of Unintended Consequences 
 
In assessing the possibility of negative unintended consequences resulting from the tax, 
we need to compare the impact of the proposed STT with the average cost of trading stocks in 
today’s markets, since the risk of negative unintended consequences will depend on how much 
the tax raises the cost of trading. When referring to the cost of trading, we will refer to “basis 
points”. A basis point is just 1/100
th of a percent. Therefore, as shown above, the proposed STT 
amounts to 0.05 percent—or 5 basis points—of the average price of stocks traded. 
 
Relatively little solid data exist on the size of total transaction costs—that is, the costs 
traders incur when they buy and sell shares.  However, based on a number of studies conducted 
over the past decade, we are able to at least draw some broad conclusions.
3  For example, a 2000 
study by Prof. Ian Domowitz of Pennsylvania State University, Jack Glen of the International 
Finance Corporation, and Ananth Madhaven of ITG Inc. (and formerly of the University of 
Southern California) estimates transaction costs for both the Canadian and U.S. stock markets 
combined.  The research shows that average costs fell by more than half over two years, from an 
average of 68.2 basis points in the third quarter of 1996 to 32.4 basis points in the third quarter of 
1998.  In the same study, the authors report an average figure for transaction costs for the United 
States alone over the same period.  This average figure is 38.1 basis points. 
 
Comparing again the effects of the proposed New York STT relative to these figures, we 
see that the 5 basis points average tax rate amounts to about 13 percent (= 5/38.1) of the average 
total transaction costs in the U.S. over this period.  The 5 basis points tax would also range from 
being between 7.3 percent (=5/68.2) of total transaction costs in North American markets as of 
the third quarter of 1996, but rising to 15 percent (= 5/32.4) of these costs in the third quarter of 
1998. 
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The central question in evaluating these figures is straightforward:  whether the increase 
in costs generated by the STT would represent a major burden on traders operating in the New 
York stock markets. Let us focus on the situation for the average-sized trade.  For an average $25 
share, the proposed STT tax of 5 basis points would entail an increase in total transaction costs 
from 32.4 to 37.4 basis points.  This would be a 15 percent increase in total transaction costs in 
North American markets as of the third quarter of 1998.  At the same time, this increase in costs 
from 32.4 to 37.4 basis points would still mean that total transaction costs would remain 45 
percent below the average level of 68.2 basis points in the third quarter of 1996. 
 
There is no way one can conclude with certainly what the effects of an average 5 basis 
point increase in transaction costs would be, given that we also cannot know what the state of 
stock market itself would be at the point when the tax would be implemented. Still, it is clear 
from the evidence presented here that a tax imposed at the level being proposed would raise total 
transaction costs only to a point well within the range that traders have been paying even in the 
late 1990s.  As such, we would not expect that an STT at the level proposed is likely to produce 
substantial changes in the patterns of trading relative to what would have otherwise occurred. 
 
The Effect on New York Employment 
 
  The imposition of the STT on stock trading in New York is likely to reduce trading 
volume to some extent, given the tax will raise the costs of trading.  But, as we have discussed in 
the previous section, we would expect this decline in trading to be relatively modest. However, 
assuming there will be some decline in trading volume, this raises another question:  would this 
decline in trading produce significant job losses for people who are involved in trading 
securities?  If there were significant job losses in the securities industry, this effect could 
reverberate throughout the broader economy.  That is, if a large number of well-paid financial 
traders and others in the industry lose their jobs, this would mean that they would have less 
money to spend, which would in turn produce further job losses among people in the region 
whose jobs depend on the spending of the newly unemployed securities industry employees. 
 
  The New York City Independent Budget Office (IBO) has estimated that the 1.25 cent 
one-sided STT could produce up to 10,000 job losses in the securities industry itself 
(Independent Budget Office 2003a).  The IBO then projects that this loss of 10,000 securities 
industry jobs could lead to as many as 80,000 overall job losses in New York City’s private 
sector.  As of January 2003, total employment in New York City was 3.35 million.  A loss of 
80,000 jobs would therefore mean a 2.4 percent increase in the City’s unemployment rate.  
Especially given that unemployment in New York City stood at 9.1 percent as of January 2003, 
the loss of 80,000 private sector jobs would obviously represent a severe blow to the economy, 
raising the unemployment rate under current conditions to 11.5 percent.  It is therefore a matter 
of considerable importance to evaluate this estimate by the IBO. 
 
  The logic behind the IBO estimate follows from what we’ve sketched above.  It proceeds 
in three stages: 
 
1.  The rise in transaction costs leads to a decline in trading volume.   5
2.  The decline in trading volume means approximately 10,000 layoffs for New York 
City securities industry employees. 
3.  When 10,000 securities industries employees become unemployed, the loss of 
spending power by these people produces a total of 80,000 job losses for the City’s 
private sector.   
 
As we have said, we consider it doubtful that imposing a tax at the level being considered 
would, on its own, lead to a significant decline in trading volume.  However, even if it did 
produce a significant decline in trading volume, it is not clear that this, on its own, would lead to 
a loss of 10,000 jobs in the securities industry.  As of January 2003, 178,000 people were 
employed in the New York City securities industry.  The loss of 10,000 jobs would therefore 
mean a fall in employment in the industry by a substantial six percent. 
 
Is this estimate of job losses credible? Figure 1 presents statistics on trading volume and 
employment, from January 1990 – January 2003.  Simply observing the data patterns in this 
figure with respect to the relative movements between trading volume and employment raises 
important questions about the IBO’s estimates.  First, looking at the lower line tracking  
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while trading volume is rising slowly but fairly steadily through these initial two years.  Then, 
from 1992 through August 1994, employment rises sharply, to 174,400, while, again, trading 
volume continues to rise slowly.  Employment then flattens out for roughly the next two years 
before rising again, peaking in October 2000 at 215,900, and then beginning a sharp descent that   6
continues until January 2003.  Meanwhile, trading volume continues to rise even after 2000—
that is, while employment is falling.  Short-term sawtooth-like fluctuations in trading volume do 




The data from Figure 1 also provides some broader perspective for evaluating the 
employment loss estimates of the IBO.  As we have seen, employment in the New York City 
securities industry peaked in October 2000 at 215,900 before falling to 178,000 as of January 
2003.  That is an employment loss of 37,900 jobs.  These jobs were lost in the wake of what can 
be fairly termed a series of calamitous shocks to the New York City economy.  These shocks 
included the collapse of the stock market bubble, the subsequent corporate accounting scandals 
and major corporate bankruptcies, the broader economic recession, and, of course, the September 
11 terrorist attacks.  However, the IBO estimate effectively contends that a 1.25 cent per share 
one-sided STT would have more than one-quarter the total impact on security industries jobs in 
New York City as the combination of  all these other factors—the market collapse, the scandals 
and bankruptcies, the recession, and September 11. 
 
From our examination of the evidence, we conclude that the IBO’s claims on prospective 
employment losses from the proposed STT are not supported by empirical evidence.  Still, as we 
hasten to emphasize, we are not suggesting that the STT would produce no job losses.  Our point 
is simply that the evidence we have reviewed suggests that if there would be losses, they would 
likely be modest, certainly in comparison with the combined effects of the series of major shocks 
that the New York City economy has experienced since the latter months of 2000. In addition, 
the IBO makes no effort to estimate the other side of the employment effects of the STT—that is, 
the employment gains that would result through being able to avoid cutting $3.5 billion from the 
City and State’s operating budgets.   
 
The Risk of Relocation 
 
Would the reinstatement of the STT create serious incentives for security firms and their 
clients to circumvent the tax through either 1) the securities firms relinquishing their listing on 
the New York Stock Exchange in favor of alternative trading platforms; or 2) the New York 
Stock Exchange physically relocating from New York City to northern New Jersey?  These 
possibilities have been widely discussed, most prominently in letters of April 15 of this year 
signed by the CEOs of 14 major securities and addressed to New York Governor George Pataki, 
Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, and Senate Majority Leader Joseph Bruno respectively. The 
letters assert that proponents of the STT “lack an understanding of the detrimental impact the 
STT will have on the industry and the State’s and City’s economies.”   
 
Accompanying the letters was a statement issued by the Securities Industry Association, 
which discussed in somewhat more detail the basis for the CEOs’ claim.  This statement explains 
that  
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Securities firms must adhere to “best execution” rules mandated by regulatory 
authorities.  Faced with the STT, these firms are likely to gravitate towards 
Electronic Crossing Networks (ECNs), Automatic Trading Systems (ATSs) and 
other alternative trading platforms, which are not within the tax jurisdiction of the 
State. 
 
Do such threats carry substance?  We need to distinguish, and consider separately, the 
two possibilities—that firms might delist from the New York Stock Exchange or that they might 
physically remove themselves from New York. 
 
Delisting from the New York Stock Exchange.    
 
  In our view, reinstatement of the STT at half its 1981 rate is highly unlikely to induce the 
outcomes that the Securities Industry Association claims.  The reason is straightforward:  even 
with the reinstatement of the STT, overall transaction costs for firms trading on the New York 
exchanges would still be well below those of alternative trading platforms. 
 
  Overall transaction costs are lower on the NYSE than on the other exchanges that could 
serve as a substitute. Why is this the case? The primary reason is that, in most situations, the 
NYSE is simply more liquid—that is, it is easier to match buyers to facilitate an exchange.  The 
NYSE is a larger and more organized market, which in turn means that more possibilities exist 
on the NYSE to find the best possible trading partners.  This is true even as differences in 
explicit execution costs—primarily the fees one pays to brokers in the two markets—are 
relatively narrow. 
 
The advantages in overall trading costs for the NYSE relative to the NASDAQ become 
even more pronounced in comparison with the “Electronic Crossing Networks (ECNs), 
Automatic Trading Systems (ATSs) and other alternative trading platforms” to which the 
Securities Industry Association memo refers.  ECNs provide benefits by increasing the technical 
efficiency of executing trades.  However, the ECNs also introduce several problems for traders, 
such as raising significantly the possibility of failing to execute a trade because dealers are not 
available to facilitate the trade.  Moreover, in the absence of dealers, it becomes more difficult to 
discover what the appropriate price should be at which trades will take place.  It is precisely in 
recognition of these problems that trading on the NYSE has maintained its dominance over the 
ECN alternatives.  This dominance has only strengthened with the bursting of the 1990s market 
bubble.  As a recent report in the Wall Street Journal points out, there have been 
 
Countless predictions that the stock exchange, with its reliance on a physical floor 
to bring traders together, would one day be made obsolete by faster, cheaper 
electronic markets.  Those predictions reached a peak with the 1990s bull 
market….But ECNs had difficulty reaching the critical mass of trading volume 
they needed.  Unless they had lots of volume, big traders wouldn’t be confident of 
getting the best possible price on them.  At the same time, without those big 
traders, reaching that volume was difficult.  Meanwhile, the meltdown in 
technology stocks and the three-year bear market have severely scaled back the   8
NASDAQ’s volume, prestige and ambitions.  Now many ECNs are struggling to 
survive. The NYSE has also suffered from the bear market, but not nearly as 
much.  And even its critics acknowledge there is no place else they can trade such 
large volumes of blue-chip stocks as efficiently.  (4/18/03). 
 
  The advantages of the NYSE relative to other exchanges in the U.S. are similar. None of 
the exchanges outside of New York operate at levels of trading volume, and thus of liquidity, 
even close to that offered by the NYSE.  For example, the largest markets outside of New York 
are the Chicago and Cincinnati Stock Exchanges which, despite the latter’s name, are both based 
in Chicago’s financial district.  Trading volume on the Chicago Stock Exchange was 5.1 percent 
of the NYSE in 2001.  As for the Cincinnati exchange, virtually all the firms trading there are 
cross-listed on NASDAQ.  They would therefore lose the liquidity advantages of operating on 
NASDAQ if they chose to list themselves solely on the Cincinnati exchange.  Other exchanges 
include the Archipelago Exchange, with 2.1 percent of the dollar volume of the NYSE in 2002, 
the Boston exchange, at 2.1 percent in 2001, and the Pacific exchange, at 0.4 percent in 2001. 
 
Over time, it is conceivable that the cost advantages of trading in New York could erode 
as other trade platforms develop.  However, because the benefits of trading in New York are so 
large at present, any firm that chooses to migrate now would face the near-certainty of 
significantly higher trading costs—even after paying the STT.  The Securities Industry 
Association memo emphasizes that “securities firms must adhere to ‘best execution’ rules 
mandated by regulatory authorities.”  The term “best execution” is typically interpreted to mean 
trading at the most favorable price available in the market.  What emerges from the available 
evidence is that, to maintain adherence to “best execution” standards, firms that trade on the 
NYSE at present would need to continue doing so even if the STT were reinstated. 
 
Relocating the NYSE to New Jersey 
 
In theory, all of the advantages of trading on the NYSE could be retained, while the STT 
could also be circumvented, if the entire exchange simply relocated to northern New Jersey.  But 
this also seems like an implausible scenario in light of the modest increase in overall transaction 
costs that would result from the proposed STT. 
 
The NYSE has made frequent threats to relocate over the past 100 years.  Prof. Michael 
Wallace in A New Deal for New York (2002) points out that the Exchange threatened to move to 
New Jersey in the first decade of the 20
th century, after New York initially adopted the STT.  The 
most recent threat to relocate took place between 1998 and 2001.  This involved a bidding war 
between New York and New Jersey, with each offering incentive packages to the NYSE (Pacelle 
and Ip 1998, Bagli 1998).  These packages focused on infrastructure development and direct 
incentives, including the construction of a new building with an expanded trading floor 
(Independent Budget Office 2001). What seems clear is that the successful re-development of 
lower Manhattan, including the infrastructure projects being planned around the former World 
Trade Center site, will exert more influence over any plans to move the NYSE than the modest 
transaction cost increases resulting from the low-level STT.  Moreover, the revenues generated 
by the STT can themselves contribute toward maintaining the NYSE in New York, since these 
revenues will be a funding source for the re-development of lower Manhattan.   9
 
There is another perspective from which we can evaluate the prospects of the NYSE 
relocating in order for those trading on it to avoid paying the STT.  This is the fact that the costs 
that securities firms pay at present for maintaining their operations in Manhattan are already 
significantly higher than what they would be in New Jersey.  As one important component of 
total costs, the average rents for offices in northern New Jersey are approximately $24.00 per 
square foot per year compared to $35.00 per square foot per year in lower Manhattan (CB 
Richard-Ellis 2002, 2003).  That is, securities firms are paying at present a 30 percent premium 
on rent for maintaining their offices in Manhattan.  Thus, if lower costs were the driving factor 




Each of the negative consequences from the STT that we have considered exists as a 
possibility, but they are not likely to impose significant costs on the City and State economies.  
As such, we conclude that the revenues generated by the STT, and the ability to use these 
revenues to ameliorate the current fiscal crisis, outweigh the costs of reinstating the tax. 
 
On its own, the $3.4 billion in revenues that would be generated by the STT under current 
conditions will not be sufficient to close the budget gap for either the City or the State.  But it 
will go far toward preventing the most severe consequences that could result from the fiscal 
crisis. Enabling the City and State to avoid imposing such severe budget cuts will also establish a 
firmer foundation on which the private sector of the region can begin growing out of the current 
prolonged economic slump.  In fact, the private sector will not be able to sustain its upward 
momentum out of the slump without the stabilizing effects of a viable public sector.  Moreover, 
the benefits of any renewed economic growth will not be broadly shared if public spending on 
education, health, social welfare, and safety are allowed to continue deteriorating. 
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